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 ‘Everything is Politics’: Understanding the political dimensions of 
NGO legitimacy in conflict-affected and transitional contexts  
Oliver Walton 
Abstract 
This paper examines how national NGOs operating in conflict-affected or transitional regions 
generate and maintain legitimacy. It considers the experience of NGOs in three such contexts – 
Sri Lanka, Nepal and the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT). The paper argues that existing 
accounts of NGO legitimacy are unhelpful for understanding the dynamic and highly politicised 
processes of NGO legitimation that can be observed in these contexts and argues that greater 
attention should be paid to the contextual and political dimensions of NGO legitimation and de-
legitimation. 
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1 Introduction 
The paper seeks to understand how national NGOs in conflict-affected and transitional contexts 
generate and maintain legitimacy by examining the experience of NGO sectors in three such 
regions (Sri Lanka, Nepal and the Occupied Palestinian Territories [OPT]). This analysis highlights 
several important ways in which the dynamics of NGO legitimation and de-legitimation in these 
regions diverge from those described in most existing accounts of NGO legitimacy. The paper 
provides a corrective to existing accounts of NGO legitimacy, which have depicted legitimacy as 
arising in a stable fashion in relation to generalisable technical qualities such as downward 
accountability, representativeness, performance and transparency (Edwards & Hulme 1996; 
Fowler 1997; Pearce 1997; Atack 1998; Hudson 2000; Slim 2002). 
The paper argues that NGO legitimacy in conflict-affected and transitional contexts is closely 
bound up with broader political and societal legitimacy struggles concerning political authority 
and state sovereignty. It also finds that processes of NGO legitimation in these environments are 
liable to fluctuate in relation to changes in the political climate and are likely to be 
instrumentalised by political actors. Based on an examination of these characteristics, the paper 
advocates an approach to understanding NGO legitimacy that pays greater attention to the 
contextual and political dimensions of processes of legitimation and de-legitimation.  
This approach was originally developed in the course of research on national NGOs in Sri Lanka 
(Walton 2008: 2012; Walton with Saravanamuttu 2011), but has been adapted in the course of 
secondary research on NGOs in the OPT and Nepal. The paper adopts an exploratory approach, 
seeking to identify some key characteristics of legitimation processes in conflict-affected regions. 
It is hoped that this analysis will highlight commonalities with other conflict-affected contexts, 
but it is acknowledged that the findings may need to be refined or further qualified in light of 
further cases. Furthermore, while the characteristics identified in this paper appear to have 
particular relevance in regions affected by violent conflict or rapid political transitions, they may 
also be present in more peaceful or politically-stable contexts.  
The next section provides some brief background to the terms ‘legitimacy’ and ‘NGOs’, and 
illustrates why the existing literature on NGO legitimacy is unhelpful for understanding how 
national NGOs working in conflict-affected countries generate and maintain legitimacy. Section 
two highlights some of the ways in which processes of legitimation in conflict-affected regions 
may differ from those in more peaceful regions. Section three provides some brief background 
to the three contexts explored in the paper (Sri Lanka, the OPT and Nepal), highlighting some of 
the key differences in how NGOs operate and are perceived in these contexts. The next three 
sections (four to six) draw examples from the three contexts to demonstrate some of the key 
factors influencing NGO legitimation processes in conflict-affected environments. These factors 
include a range of issues that stem from changing patterns in international intervention in these 
contexts including a trend towards professionalization of NGO sectors and issues of boundary 
maintenance and transgression associated with liberal peacebuilding interventions. Section eight 
focuses on NGOs’ engagement in political action in these contexts, and how NGO legitimacy is 
heavily influenced by the legitimation strategies of domestic political actors. The paper 
concludes by drawing together some key findings from the case studies and making some 
suggestions for improving understanding of NGO legitimacy in these contexts. 
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2 Legitimacy and NGOs 
This paper understands legitimacy as ‘the generalized perception or assumption that the actions 
of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within a social system’ (Suchman 1995: 374-5).  
It refers to a sense that a social entity or organisation ‘is lawful, proper, admissible and justified 
in doing what it does, and saying what it says, and that it continues to enjoy the support of an 
identifiable community' (Edwards 1999, 258). In this way, legitimacy should be understood as a 
process of consensus-building amongst a particular group, community or society of actors 
(Johnson et al. 2006).  I view legitimacy as a matter of degree rather than as an absolute quality 
(Collingwood & Logister 2005) and maintain that where NGOs are deemed legitimate, this 
legitimacy is almost always contested.  Furthermore, I recognise that legitimacy can be 
generated in a variety of different ways, in relation to a range of often conflicting normative and 
cognitive frameworks. 
If generating legitimacy is about building consensus, however, this process is rarely 
straightforward; several competing frameworks determining what constitutes legitimate 
behaviour may coexist within a society or group, and different groups or individuals may have 
different ideas about what might constitute a legitimate actor or legitimate acts (Edwards 1999; 
Lister 2003; Brown 2008). Furthermore, while legitimacy is dependent upon apparent 
consensus, this does not necessarily imply actual consensus; legitimacy can be maintained in 
spite of disagreement from some individuals (Johnson 2006: 57). The ambiguity of these 
processes of legitimation have led to accusations that the term ‘legitimacy’ is too woolly and 
vague to be analytically useful. O’Kane (1993), for example, argues that the term blurs the 
grounds for compliance or the framework for justifying action and the action itself, rendering it 
confusing at best and misleading at worst.   
Whilst these criticisms highlight important problems with the term, a conception of legitimacy 
seems useful for explaining how various non-governmental actors are able to influence others 
without controlling the distribution of resources or coercion. NGO power has an ephemeral 
quality: much of NGOs’ strength and their capacity to influence is often dependent upon an 
appearance of vulnerability (Bryant 2005). When NGOs appear to be too powerful, their 
legitimacy may be challenged and influence can be lost.  
Legitimacy is a problematic concept because it can be understood “both [as] a belief held by 
subjects, or by some subjects, and a claim made by rulers” (Barker 1990: 59). This paper 
recognises both aspects of legitimacy and whilst my aim is to study legitimacy in the sociological 
sense, I also recognise the relevance of the more normative or self-serving side of legitimacy, 
particularly in understanding NGOs’ own efforts to influence processes of legitimation.   
The term ‘NGO’ covers a diverse array of entities from small community-based organisations, to 
large transnational advocacy groups. I adopt Gerard Clarke’s (1998: 2-3) definition: NGOs are 
“private, non-profit, professional organizations with a distinctive legal character, concerned with 
public welfare goals”. My focus is on organisations that have used the label of ‘non-
governmental organisation’ to describe themselves, excluding a range of other bodies often 
included under the broader banner of ‘civil society’. In doing so, it utilises the term ‘NGO’ 
principally as a ‘claim-bearing label’: a public indication that an organisation conforms to 
expectations of a certain kind of Westernised, professionalised, development organisation that 
receives foreign funding (Hilhorst 2003: 6).  
‘Everything is Politics’  
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The paper focuses on a particular subset of NGOs that I refer to as ‘national NGOs’. I define 
NGOs as ‘national’ on the basis of their spatial rather than territorial coverage.  National NGOs, 
in other words, are organisations that claim to be operating across an entire country, as opposed 
to the issues of some distinct region or community within it (see Bryant 2005). In practice, there 
is often a wide gap between NGOs’ spatial claims and their actual territorial coverage. National 
NGOs also vary considerably in terms of their size, organisational character and objectives.  
National NGOs can be distinguished from both international NGOs (INGOs) and community 
based organisations (CBOs) and serve as classic ‘interface experts’ (Lewis & Mosse 2006) capable 
of providing a bridge between INGOs or funding agencies and local populations. Their appeal to 
funders lies primarily in their capacity to combine a degree of local knowledge with an 
understanding of international development discourse.   
The term ‘legitimacy’ has occupied a central place in contemporary accounts of NGOs’ work, 
being generally employed to grapple with the growing dilemmas of NGO accountability, 
representativeness and performance that accompanied the expansion of NGO activities in the 
1990s (Lister 2003; see also Edwards & Hulme 1996; Fowler 1997; Pearce 1997; Atack 1998; 
Hudson 2000; Slim 2002; Brown 2008). Most of this work has come from a practitioner 
perspective which highlighted ‘technical’ deficiencies in NGOs’ work and as a result, the concept 
of legitimacy has been poorly theorised in the NGO literature (Lister 2003). In many cases, rather 
than being treated as a complex sociological phenomenon to be unravelled via empirical 
analysis, these authors have tended to see legitimacy as a normative concept ‘that defines what 
the proper political and legal constraints on power should be’ (Collingwood & Logister 2005: 
178).1 
These accounts have argued that as NGOs’ work has become more diverse, and their financial 
and political clout has grown, the balance of accountabilities upon which their legitimacy rested 
has been distorted, and NGOs have become more focused on upwards accountability towards 
donors, distancing them from their core constituencies (Edwards & Hulme 1997) and eroding the 
roots in social solidarity ‘that legitimize NGOs as independent actors in their own societies’ 
(Edwards 1999: 266). In response, these approaches often emphasised a relatively standardised 
formula that NGOs could apply in order to rebuild legitimacy; by placing more emphasis on 
downwards accountability to beneficiaries and improving standards of organisational 
accountability and transparency (Edwards & Hulme 1996; Fowler 1997; Pearce 1997; Atack 
1998; Edwards 1999; Hudson 2000). 
While these perspectives are frequently invoked by NGOs operating in conflict-affected contexts, 
they seem to offer few clues for understanding the crises of NGO legitimacy that can be 
observed during transitional periods in conflict-affected contexts such as Nepal, the OPT and Sri 
Lanka.  In these contexts, NGOs were not simply being judged in relation to singular benchmarks 
of accountability and transparency, but instead were being critiqued in different ways by 
different audiences. Furthermore, the frameworks employed to assess NGO legitimacy were 
often highly politicised and changeable.   
Much more useful to understanding these processes of legitimation and de-legitimation in 
conflict regions is Lister’s (2003) socially-constructed account of NGO legitimacy. This approach 
places much greater emphasis on NGOs’ operating environments and relationships with various 
                                                             
1 See Hashemi & Hassan (1999: 124-5) for an example of this normative conception of legitimacy. 
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different actors: “Not only do different organizations operate within slightly different 
environments, each organization operates within a number of environments with different 
stakeholders” (Lister 2003: 179). 
Lister’s approach also recognises that different actors privilege different aspects of NGOs’ work 
and that the “approaches, interests and perceptions of the stakeholders, not the agency, 
determine which characteristics create legitimacy” (Lister 2003: 181). Drawing on organisational 
theory and particularly the work of Suchman (1995), Lister (2003) sees NGOs as reliant on four 
different kinds of legitimacy: normative legitimacy (based on acceptable and desirable norms, 
standards, and values), cognitive legitimacy (based on goals and activities that fit with broad 
social understandings of what is appropriate, proper, and desirable), regulatory legitimacy 
(abiding by laws and regulations) and pragmatic legitimacy (conforming to demands for services, 
partnership or by receiving private funding). Different audiences will develop their own 
understandings of these different kinds of legitimacy. The fundamentally contested nature of 
NGO legitimacy is also acknowledged by authors such as Edwards (1999: 260) who describes 
how “questions of [NGO] legitimacy involve judgements and choices, struggles and negotiations 
about what NGOs do and who has what rights to influence organizational decisions” and Brown 
(2008: 41) who identifies what he terms a ‘constructionist perspective’ on NGO legitimacy that 
“assumes that legitimacy and accountability problems involve implicit and subjective standards 
held by actors with diverse interests, expertise and power”. These constructivist approaches 
draw on Foucauldian understandings of power and, in particular, the idea that power is 
structured by discourses, which determine which actions are thinkable and which are not 
(Foucault 1990). From this perspective, NGO legitimacy is seen as determined by NGOs’ capacity 
to conform to dominant discourses in the global and domestic arenas, and their ability to 
negotiate inconsistencies that arise between these two realms.  
One of the problems with the existing literature on NGO legitimacy, for my purposes, has been 
the fact that, to date, it has focused on problems facing international NGOs (Slim 2002; Edwards 
2003; Collingwood & Logister 2005; McGann & Johnstone 2005; Lehr-Lehnhardt 2005).  National 
NGOs are likely to address more concrete political concerns arising from their own national 
context and may, therefore, pose a greater threat to power holders than INGOs, whose 
criticisms may be less pointed or easier to deflect.  
This literature has also rarely touched on the specific legitimacy problems facing national (or 
local) NGOs working in ‘delicate and contested political fields’ that exist in many conflict-
affected contexts (Korf 2006). As Lister (2003: 184) has argued, it is important to consider 
“‘which legitimacy matters’ and the relative ‘weights’ of different organizational stakeholders in 
determining legitimacy”. These issues are particularly relevant in conflictual and transitional 
contexts, where the relative influence of various actors can fluctuate in relation to changing 
political conditions. 
In conflict-affected environments, the political incentives associated with legitimising or de-
legitimising NGOs are often of greater importance to understanding a decline in legitimacy than 
NGOs’ own failure to conform to prevailing frameworks for understanding or justifying NGO 
action. In the contexts examined in this paper, the stakeholders or audiences identified by Lister 
(2003) did not simply constitute passive groups looking on at NGOs’ behaviour and judging it in 
accordance with their own frameworks for cognitive and normative legitimacy. Instead, these 
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groups tended to use NGO legitimacy as a tool to highlight or articulate their own political 
agendas.   
Another aspect of NGO legitimacy that has been underplayed in the existing literature is the role 
of the state in shaping processes of legitimation. As Clarke (1998) has described, the dominant 
view of NGOs’ legitimate political role varied widely according to context. As will be described 
below, regions affected by violent conflict are characterised by struggles over political authority 
that are liable to change, often very rapidly. As a result, dominant perceptions about the 
legitimacy of NGOs’ roles – and particularly their engagement in political action –  are also likely 
to fluctuate as governments change or countries make the transition from peace to war or vice 
versa.  
3 NGOs in Conflict-affected regions 
The way in which NGOs engage in politics is an important site of political debate. This debate 
often hinges on competing notions of legitimate political action. These debates are often 
especially fraught during a period of war and, in particular, in the transitional moments between 
war and peace. Political action of all kinds becomes more contentious during a time of conflict 
because it tends to be framed in terms of its support for one or other of the conflicting sides, 
accentuating tensions between NGOs’ multiple accountabilities (Goodhand 2004). Governments 
at war cannot be seen as fully legitimate in the sense understood by Beetham (1991) since, 
according to him, legitimacy requires evidence of consent between the dominant and 
subordinate parties. Conflict often involves a struggle for power between two or more parties 
attempting to pursue rival paths towards legitimacy, in accordance with different sets of rules 
and beliefs. In these contexts, NGO legitimacy becomes framed by a broader struggle for 
legitimacy between conflict actors. 
War zones involve a high degree of contestation over the control of populations. As a result, the 
involvement of NGOs, either by distributing resources or attempting to influence the way in 
which power is distributed, is likely to be contentious. Efforts to strengthen the agency of 
civilians can raise the suspicions of power holders (Korf 2006: 56). In highly contested areas 
(such as the North and East of Sri Lanka or in the OPT), NGO projects are also liable to become 
instrumentalised as a means of boosting the legitimacy of other actors. 
Conflict often undermines NGOs’ capacity to fulfil objectives and may trigger sudden changes in 
popular perceptions about what constitutes legitimate political behaviour. Conflict also 
increases the demand from other actors to undermine the legitimacy of NGOs, providing a low-
risk opportunity to consolidate political support and promote their own visions for legitimate 
rule. This makes NGOs more likely to fall victim to ‘reputation entrepreneurs’, who 
instrumentalise the reputations of NGOs as a means of articulating their own political agendas 
(Bryant 2005).  
Many conflict regions are governed by weak or emergent state institutions, which may compete 
with NGOs for material resources or political capital. In Nepal, after the establishment of a 
parliamentary monarchy in 1990, or the takeover of government by King Gyanendra in 2005, for 
example, state institutions were unclear about their capacities and powers and introduced new 
laws to restrict their activities (Heaton Shrestha 2010; Miklian et al. 2011). Similarly, in the OPT, 
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NGOs competed for funds with the emerging Palestinian National Authority (PNA) and were 
seen as a threat by some elements within the PNA, particularly during periods when the sector 
received large amounts of funding from international donors (Challand 2009).  
The transitional moments between war and peace raise particular issues for NGO legitimacy.  
NGO legitimacy is closely related to prevailing political norms and agendas, which are likely to 
change during times of transition. During these transitional periods, expectations from both 
domestic and international actors regarding what constitutes legitimate political aims of NGOs 
are likely to shift significantly. As well as being liable to fluctuate in relation to the prevailing 
political climate, the legitimacy of national NGOs is likely to be closely influenced by the agendas 
of dominant political actors and these players’ own struggles for legitimacy. In each of the three 
contexts explored in this paper, state institutions clamped down on NGOs in the aftermath of 
political transitions. In Sri Lanka, the change of government in 2004 led to a nationalist backlash 
against NGOs which involved a large degree of media criticism and a parliamentary enquiry into 
NGOs’ activities (Walton 2008). As mentioned above, in Nepal, during the political transitions of 
the 1990s and in 2005, central and local government institutions sought to tighten restrictions 
on NGOs (Heaton Shrestha 2010). In the OPT after the second intifada in 2000, NGOs came 
under widespread criticism for being too apolitical and insulated from the national struggle 
(Challand 2009). 
In societies where key political actors are at war, questions of accountability, representativeness 
and bias become charged with political symbolism. NGO legitimacy in these contexts is often 
framed by, and hinges upon various political, institutional and territorial boundaries or models 
of proper NGO action. Different actors may draw on or highlight different boundaries in different 
contexts, but key lines of contestation include the boundary between the international and 
national realm, between state and non-state, and perceived boundaries between proper and 
improper political roles for NGOs. These boundaries are complex and may have political, 
territorial and social dimensions. 
Before moving on, it is important to stress that many of the tensions and difficulties affecting 
NGO legitimacy during periods of conflict may also be observed during more peaceful periods. In 
the case of Nepal there appear to be clear continuities between pre-conflict, conflict and ‘post-
conflict’ periods. For example, during all three periods political parties sought to both control or 
regulate the NGO sector, and to use it as a channel for providing access to valued resources. In 
this case, however, ascertaining how closely NGOs’ legitimation strategies have been 
determined by the conflict environment, or by an extended period of political instability is made 
more difficult by the fact that very little has been written about the NGO sector prior to the 
onset of conflict in 1996 and the fact that the modern NGO sector itself only emerged in the 
1990s – a period characterised by a series of political transitions.2  
4 Three Case Studies: Variations in the environment for 
legitimation 
This section provides a brief overview of the three contexts examined in this paper. Although the 
paper focuses on several important common features of conflict-affected regions, it is important 
                                                             
2 I am grateful to Celayne Heaton Shresthra for these points. 
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to note that the three cases examined here are marked by important differences. After 
providing a brief introduction to each case, the paper will highlight a few of the key differences 
between the three contexts. The key features of these three cases are summarised in the table 
below: 
 Sri Lanka OPT Nepal 
Background 
to Conflict 
Conflict in Sri Lanka is best understood 
as an outcome of a ‘crisis in the 
identity, policies and legitimacy of the 
state’ (Goodhand 2001, 30). Key 
sources include state bias, economic 
liberalisation, uneven development 
patterns, the politics of exclusion, and 
ethnic scapegoating. 
An international conflict between 
Israel and the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories concerning borders, 
security, and international 
recognition. After Hamas won 
control of Gaza in 2006, an 
internal conflict between the two 
main Palestinian political parties – 
Hamas and Fatah has been 
ongoing. 
Anti-government armed 
revolutionary struggle led by the 
Communist Party of Nepal 
(Maoists) in order to establish a 
new broad-based, inclusive social 
and political system. The armed 
struggle (1996-2006) occurred 
during a longer period of political 
transitions, including the 
transition to a parliamentary 
monarchy, in 1990 and the 
abolition of the monarchy in 2008.  
Role of 
international 
actors 
The peace process (2002-2006) was 
heavily internationalised – facilitated 
by Norway, and supported by four co-
chairs – India, Japan, the US, and the 
EU. Since coming to power, the 
Rajapaksa government strengthened 
links with regional powers, which 
compensated for a shortfall in funding 
from western donors, and helped to 
deflect criticism from western 
countries in international forums. 
The conflict has been heavily 
internationalised, with several 
external efforts to broker a peace 
deal since the Oslo Peace Accords 
in 1993. The PNA has been reliant 
on foreign aid since it was 
established in 1994. 
United Nations Mission in Nepal 
(UNMIN) was established in 2007 
to monitor the disarmament of 
the Maoist army, monitoring 
ceasefire commitments and to 
help prepare for the Constituent 
Assembly elections in 2008. A 
range of other international actors 
have supported the peace process 
and supported the transition to a 
federal system of governance. 
Background 
to the NGO 
sector 
A vibrant NGO sector in the 1970s and 
80s, although more radical groups 
were marginalised during the growing 
authoritarianism since the late 1970s. 
The number of development-oriented 
NGOs expanded rapidly in 1990s, 
spurred by growth in foreign funding.  
Civil society historically played an 
important role in Palestinian 
society. The formal NGO sector 
grew rapidly in 1990s prompted by 
a rise in foreign funding after the 
1993 Oslo Peace Accords. There 
have been growing divisions 
between the modern and 
traditional elements of civil 
society. 
A very limited independent NGO 
sector prior to 1990. The sector 
grew rapidly in 1990s and 2000s 
driven by rise in foreign funding, 
and government efforts to 
promote the sector. 
State – NGO 
relations 
History of suspicion and opposition 
from Sinhala nationalist groups. 
Successive governments have 
switched from collaboration to 
opposition. 
As the NGO sector grew in 1990s, 
PNA increasingly saw NGOs as a 
threat. After second intifada, the 
relationship became more 
cooperative.  
The state provided very limited 
space for the NGO sector to 
emerge prior to 1990. Since then, 
the relationship has been 
changeable – during periods of 
uncertainty or transition the state 
has tried to introduce more 
rigorous formal regulations for 
NGOs. Politicians have also seen 
NGOs as a key channel for 
accessing of various resources. 
Nature of 
international 
support to 
NGOs 
Large amounts of funding have been 
closely linked to support of the peace 
process. Many funds for NGOs focused 
on peacebuilding activities during this 
period. 
International funding has been 
closely tied in with the peace 
process, but has focused mostly on 
development work and, in the 
aftermath of the second intifada, 
on humanitarian relief 
Until recently, funding for NGOs in 
Nepal focused mainly on 
development and human rights 
monitoring work. Since 2007, 
however, donors have funded 
peacebuilding activities such as 
local reconciliation and 
development projects that seek to 
build a ‘peace dividend’ 
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Sri Lanka has experienced a series of political conflicts since the 1970s. These included a 
confrontation between the Government and a youth-based Marxist group based in the South, 
the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), which occurred first in 1971 and then later in the late 
1980s. They also included a long-running civil war against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE), a Tamil separatist group based in the North and East, which began in 1983 and continued 
until 2009. In line with global trends, the NGO sector grew considerably in the 1990s, spurred on 
by a growth in foreign funding. President Mahinda Rajapakse came to power in 2005, and 
resumed all-out war with the LTTE in 2006. The regime was reliant on nationalist parties for 
support, who were concerned about the role of NGOs in society and were particularly critical of 
their close relationships with foreign donors and their support of the peace process.  
Civil society and NGOs have historically played an important role in the politics and society of the 
OPT. As in Sri Lanka, the sector grew rapidly in the 1990s after the 1993 Oslo Accords, which 
prompted a large rise in foreign funding. Funding has tended to be concentrated in the hands of 
a small number of ‘donor darlings’ (Youngs & Michou 2011: 13). The relationship between 
Palestinian NGOs’ and the PNA has been changeable.  The relative proportion of donor funding 
channelled through NGOs and the PNA fluctuated throughout the 1990s and 2000s.  As funding 
to NGOs grew, the PNA began to view them as a threat, damaging relations between the two 
sectors (Hammami 2000). The relationship has become more co-operative since the second 
intifada, although the space for dialogue and dissent from NGOs has diminished since the 2007 
split in the PNA (Walton 2010). It is important to note that operational context for NGOs in the 
West Bank is very different from the environment in Gaza. Since it won control of Gaza in 2006, 
Hamas has tended to view human rights and democracy NGOs as opponents (Youngs & Michou 
2011). 
The NGO sector only emerged as a significant feature of Nepali politics and society after the 
National Democratic Movement of the 1990s (Chand 2002). The sector grew rapidly in the 1990s 
and 2000s and, as with the other contexts examined in this paper, received high levels of foreign 
funding.   Like the OPT, Nepal is highly aid dependent. In the period between 1995 and 2002, aid 
constituted nearly 9% of Nepal’s GDP.3 NGOs played an important role in supporting the 2006 
Democracy Movement, which eventually led to the abolition of the monarchy and the 
Comprehensive Peace Accord, signed in November 2006. This period, however, also highlighted 
tensions between NGOs and other civil society groups (Heaton Shrestha 2010; Heaton Shrestha 
and Adhikari 2011). Most of these tensions related to the fact that NGOs were widely seen as 
professionalised and factional (Heaton Shrestha & Adhikari 2011; Nikolov 2011). 
The remainder of this section will highlight some key differences between the three contexts 
examined in the paper. One of the most important points of variation concerns state capacity 
and state legitimacy. Since 2006, when Hamas took control of Gaza, the Territories have been 
internally divided, with both the Hamas government in Gaza, and the Fatah-led government in 
the West Bank claiming to be the legitimate representatives of the OPT. The Territories’ 
international legitimacy is also contested, with only 132 of 193 UN members formally 
recognising Palestine as a sovereign state. State institutions in both Gaza and the West Bank are 
                                                             
3 By comparison, the figure for Sri Lanka during the same period was only 3% (Bhattarai 2007), while the 
figure for the OPT was 14% in 2009. One recent study of Nepal estimates that international aid constitutes 
over a quarter of the annual state budget (Miklian et al. 2011). 
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very weak. The OPT are heavily dependent on aid, and funding levels decreased significantly 
after Hamas won control of Gaza in 2006 (Walton 2010).  
State institutions in Nepal and Sri Lanka are less divided, and the countries’ international 
sovereignty is not contested. Nevertheless the Nepali state has undergone a number of 
importance transitions since 1990 and has faced an existential threat in the face of the Maoist 
insurgency between 1996 and 2006, which affected 50 of the country’s 75 districts. The state’s 
capacity to monitor and regulate the NGO sector is poor, particularly in more remote districts.  
During the conflict between the government and the LTTE in Sri Lanka, the government lost 
territorial control of large parts of the North and East, although these regions were won back 
during the final phase of war between 2006 and 2009. Although governance has continued to 
become more centralised and politicised since the end of the war, state institutions are generally 
robust and the government is able to closely regulate the NGO sector.  
While in Nepal and the OPT, state institutions and NGOs have at times existed as serious rivals 
for international funding and legitimacy (see Heaton Shrestha 2010; Challand 2009), in Sri Lanka, 
the NGO sector has been viewed as a threat more for security, political or symbolic reasons 
(Walton 2008). While struggles over state legitimacy are a common feature of all conflict-
affected regions, this struggle is particularly intense in the OPT. Here, NGOs operate within a 
series of multi-layered legitimacy struggles at the Palestinian, regional and international levels. 
The questions of Palestinian sovereignty, the Israeli occupation, and the rights of populations 
living in the OPT are embedded in international politics to an unusual degree. As a result, the 
legitimacy struggles taking place on the local, regional and global levels are particularly 
entangled (Slim 2008). 
The nature of international support to NGOs has been different in the three contexts. In the 
OPT, international funding has been closely tied in with the peace process, but has focused 
mostly on development work and, in the aftermath of the second intifada, on humanitarian 
relief. In Sri Lanka, funding has also been closely linked to support of the peace process, but 
more explicitly focused on peacebuilding activities. Until recent years, funding for NGOs in Nepal 
focused mainly on development and to a lesser extent human rights monitoring work. Since 
2007, however, donors have funded peacebuilding activities such as local reconciliation and 
development projects that seek to build a ‘peace dividend’ (see for example UNPFN 2011).  
The following sections will highlight a number of important common features that exist in the 
three cases and examine ways in which legitimation processes in conflict regions deviate from 
the processes described in the mainstream literature on NGO legitimacy. It is important to note 
that while these dynamics appear to be specific to conflict regions, they are often driven by 
factors (such as a rapid growth in donor funding for NGOs) that also have relevance to other 
contexts. Furthermore some   of these dynamics (such as a growing professionalization of NGOs) 
can also be observed in more peaceful contexts. 
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5 The impact of liberal peacebuilding interventions on NGO 
legitimacy: professionalization and association with foreign 
agendas 
Powerful anti-NGO discourses exist in many developing countries, and are usually based on fears 
that NGOs are providing a surreptitious means for foreign governments to influence domestic 
politics.  The sites of experiments in ‘liberal peacebuilding’ of the 1990s and 2000s provided 
particularly fertile ground for domestic opposition to NGOs.4 In these contexts, funding for NGOs 
grew rapidly, whilst NGOs became simultaneously associated with the often contentious political 
objectives of their Western governmental backers.  The NGO sectors in Sri Lanka, the OPT and 
Nepal all suffered from ‘crises of credibility’ during periods of political transition and during the 
transitional moments between war and peace (Hammami 2000; Jensen 2005; Jad 2007; Wake 
2008; Walton 2008; Walton with Saravanamuttu 2011; Walton 2012; Heaton Shrestha 2010). 
Heavy international engagement with national NGOs has created increasingly elite-dominated, 
western-oriented, professionalised NGO sectors in each of the three cases examined in this 
paper. In Sri Lanka, the majority of modern national NGOs emerged relatively suddenly in the 
1980s and 90s, in response to a contraction in government funding for welfare programmes and 
a concomitant growth in foreign funding (Fernando 2003: 27; Wickramasinghe 2006: 315). 
Before this rise in funding for NGOs from bi-lateral and multi-lateral donors, many important Sri 
Lankan development NGOs were funded by church-based international NGOs and foundations.  
These funders tended to adopt a less technical and more politically progressive view of NGOs 
(Fernando 2003). Growing foreign funding for NGOs since the late 1970s has facilitated the rise 
of a small group of English-speaking NGOs whose work and values reflect the liberal approach of 
their funders. Regional and local NGOs continued to decline in the 1980s and 1990s, driven by 
donor preferences and the growing dominance of the LTTE in the North and East.  
After the ceasefire agreement in 2002, Sri Lanka became one of the most popular sites for 
international experimentation in NGO peacebuilding (Walton 2008). Most aid to Sri Lanka after 
the ceasefire was allocated to supporting the United National Front’s economic agenda (Bastian 
2009), and peace-related activities tended to be funded by a small group western donors (led by 
the EC, Norway, Sweden, Germany, Canada, the US and the UK). This close association between 
the peacebuilding strategies of international donors and well-funded national NGOs has added a 
new dimension to the criticism of these organisations by nationalist political groups. After 2005, 
NGOs came under several waves of intense scrutiny and criticism from a number of political 
groups, who focused specifically on their close links with donors’ peacebuilding efforts (Walton 
2008; Walton with Saravanamuttu 2011).  
In the OPT, the rise in foreign funding for NGOs since the 1990s has had a significant impact on 
the character and orientation of the sector. NGOs have become more pre-occupied with funding 
(MAS 2007) and have become increasingly distant both from the communities they purport to 
                                                             
4 I use the term ‘liberal peacebuilding’ to refer to the dominant approach to peacebuilding pursued by 
inter-governmental, multilateral and bilateral donors since the end of the Cold War. The model that 
emerged in the 1990s combined a more aggressive pursuit of long-standing international policy goals of 
economic and political liberalisation, with a commitment to reaching an internationally-backed peace 
settlement and by managing local level conflicts through a range of measures designed to improve the 
security of local populations. 
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serve and from political parties (Hammami 2000; Shafi 2004; Hanafi and Tabar 2005; Challand 
2009). Some argue that donor efforts to support civil society have de-politicised and divided the 
sector (Jad 2007). Others suggest that donor aid has generated a new ‘globalised elite’, which is 
politically oriented towards western donors and European forms of social organisation (Hanafi 
and Tabar 2005; Challand 2009, 2010). Increased aid has had a number of negative effects on 
the NGO sector including increased internal competition, reduced accountability to communities 
and an inability to articulate a common strategic vision (Songco et al. 2006).  The un-coordinated 
and short-term nature of donor engagement with NGOs has undermined its effectiveness (MAS 
2007; CIDSE 2008).   
Accepting foreign funding in the Palestinian context is widely seen as providing implicit support 
to the peace process. In line with a widely-held criticism of international aid in the Palestinian 
context, many Palestinians view the work of foreign-funded NGOs as undermining efforts to 
resist the occupation (Youngs & Michou 2011). Some argue that the absence of social 
movements capable of mobilising effectively against the occupation is partly due to the 
tendency for “qualified grassroots activists to take up employment with international NGOs” 
(Youngs & Michou 2011: 13). Hanafi and Tabar (2003) note that, since the second intifada, NGOs 
have adopted a strikingly apolitical stance, a position they argue has been motivated by NGOs’ 
growing reliance on funding from international donors. 
The NGO sector in Nepal emerged in the 1990s and was closely linked to the growing 
involvement of foreign funders in the country during this period. Since many donors were 
unwilling to channel large sums through the state, support to NGOs constituted a large 
proportion of total donor funding. As in the other cases, the national NGO sector was dominated 
by foreign-funded organisations based in the capital Kathmandu. These organisations were 
widely seen as professionalised and lacking the requisite links with the general population to 
support popular mobilisation.  
The view that NGOs and NGO workers were money-driven is also prevalent in the Nepali 
context. This perception is particularly relevant for NGOs involved in peace work: one civil 
society activist interviewed in a recent study (Nikolov 2009: 23) described a ‘peace market’ 
where NGOs compete for donor funding in this area, while Miklian et al. (2011: 295) note that 
the UN’s white SUVs are “viewed cynically as ‘where the peace-building money trail ends’”. 
Some voices within Nepali politics and civil society have claimed that NGOs are engaged in 
activities that undermine Nepalese sovereignty and further the strategic interests of their 
funders (see Brar 2011).  
As the NGO sector attracted more resources, it also became attractive to established political 
forces. The influx of foreign aid to Nepal since the 1990s, and particularly in the aftermath of the 
Peace Accord, has encouraged national-level politicians to forge links with or establish their own 
NGOs as a means of extending patronage networks (Miklian et al. 2011). As a result, it has been 
argued that the growth of NGOs has stifled the emergence of social movements and 
exacerbated the urban/rural divide (Rehman 2006).  
As is demonstrated in each of the three cases, processes of NGO professionalization were driven 
primarily by a general rise in donor funding. In each case, however, tensions surrounding the 
professionalization of NGO sectors have been exacerbated by political transitions or conflict and 
NGOs’ involvement in peacebuilding activities. In all three contexts, NGOs’ close links with 
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donors meant that they were increasingly associated with these donors’ support for the peace 
process, even if these organisations themselves were not directly involved in peacebuilding 
work. Large national organisations based in capital cities tend to be most susceptible to these 
criticisms.   
This association with an externally-imposed liberal peacebuilding agenda appears to have 
heightened the degree to which NGOs have been attacked by nationalists and other critical 
groups.  In the OPT, this association meant that NGOs found themselves increasingly at odds 
with nationalist or Islamic groups (Youngs and Michou 2011). In Sri Lanka, NGOs’ public support 
for the peace process set them against various nationalist political groups that made a revival 
after the defeats of the United National Front at parliamentary elections in 2004 and 
presidential elections in 2005 (Walton 2008).  
Weak NGO legitimacy also stemmed from the fact that the legitimacy of liberal peacebuilding 
interventions themselves was precarious. Liberal peacebuilding operationally and institutionally 
draws together several hitherto separate strands of political thought about peace (Heathershaw 
2008). While NGOs have been typically involved in civil or socio-relational aspects of 
peacebuilding, the liberal peacebuilding approach also increasingly implicated them in the state-
building strategies of their governmental or multilateral partners. As noted above, this growing 
intimacy between NGOs and international donors was problematic and fuelled concerns that 
these organisations were being used as Trojan Horses by Western donors. In the OPT, this 
problematic association between NGOs’ bottom-up efforts to support the peace process and the 
harder, security-driven interests of donors through an increasingly explicit statebuilding agenda 
was particularly marked (Franks 2009; Youngs and Michou 2011). 
Liberal peacebuilding interventions have often been built on fragile social and political 
foundations. The failure of the peace process in Sri Lanka after 2002 has been linked in the 
academic literature to the failure of governments and international donors to address welfare 
concerns of communities in the South (Goodhand & Korf 2011). Similarly in the OPT, liberal 
peacebuilding has been unable to foster any meaningful improvement in human development 
levels, or to bolster human rights and the rule of law (Franks 2009; Challand 2009). 
This ‘virtual peace’ (Richmond & Franks 2007) left a vacuum for domestic actors to challenge the 
motivations and effectiveness of international engagement and to promote alternative visions, 
which often directly challenged the liberal norms implicit in international peacebuilding efforts.  
In Sri Lanka, a heavily internationalised peace process helped to fuel a nationalist resurgence. In 
the OPT, donors’ narrow support for professionalised NGOs has undermined community 
associations and networks, creating a vacuum that has been filled by Hamas (Jad 2007; Challand 
2010). In Nepal, donor peacebuilding efforts have fuelled a growing rural/ urban divide, which 
has undermined international peacebuilding efforts (Rehman 2006; Shah 2008). In each case, 
the broader negative outcomes associated with international peacebuilding interventions have 
undermined NGO legitimacy.  
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6 The impact of liberal peacebuilding interventions on NGO 
legitimacy: blurring boundaries 
NGOs’ growing involvement in state-led peacebuilding interventions affected legitimation 
processes in other ways. The expansion and increasing diversity of NGO activities associated 
with contemporary peacebuilding interventions made NGOs’ objectives less tangible, raising 
issues of accountability and contributing to some actors’ concerns about NGOs’ motivations. In 
Nepal, donors encouraged NGOs to pursue peacebuilding, advocacy and human rights work 
alongside service delivery. This blurred the boundaries between different spheres of NGOs’ 
work, which created tensions and lack of clarity about NGOs’ aims (Shah 2008).  
Donors increasingly prized NGOs’ capacity to transgress political, institutional and territorial 
boundaries (Goodhand & Walton 2008). In the Sri Lankan context, this involved working more 
closely alongside or at times inside, government institutions, for example by providing training 
to government workers in conflict resolution. NGOs also became increasingly involved in 
facilitating interaction across territorial boundaries, particularly between government-held and 
LTTE-controlled areas.  Donors saw NGOs as useful because of their capacity to facilitate 
interaction or build consensus between divergent or conflicting political groups. These 
transgressions became key focal points for criticism during the transition back to war as conflict 
actors increasingly worked to reassert or harden political boundaries such as the borders 
between sovereign countries, or the boundary between the state and the LTTE. Critiques often 
focused on situations where NGOs had overstepped the perceived boundaries of legitimate 
political action. NGO activities in LTTE-controlled areas became the focus of misappropriation 
scandals in which NGOs were accused of providing resources to the LTTE (see, e.g., Sunday 
Observer 2008). Similarly, instances where NGOs were deemed to have become too heavily 
involved in the governmental arena (for example by engaging in projects such as conflict 
resolution or human rights training for the military) were often used to highlight the allegedly 
sinister motivations of nongovernmental action in Sri Lanka (see PSCNGO 2008).   
Tensions between the international and national realms can be observed in post-war Nepal, 
where the government has sought to limit the role of international NGOs by restricting their 
ability to directly implement projects. International NGOs have sought to get around these laws 
by establishing local NGOs that are nominally independent, but remain closely linked to the 
‘parent’ international NGO (Miklian et al. 2011).  
In the OPT, donors encouraged NGOs to actively support efforts to strengthen the PNA and to 
avoid confrontation with government (Abusrour 2009). Donors such as USAID established 
projects that strengthened the capacity of NGOs to engage and form partnerships with 
government institutions (USAID 2011). These modes of engagement between donors and NGOs 
strengthened the perception that NGOs were serving the strategic goals of international actors.  
The evidence from these three cases then suggests that liberal peacebuilding interventions tend 
to create tensions by encouraging NGOs to transgress established territorial, institutional and 
political boundaries. The legitimacy of NGOs’ actions in these contexts was partly dependent 
upon maintaining these boundaries, and these tensions provided excellent opportunities for 
reputation entrepreneurs to critique and de-legitimize national NGOs. 
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7 Legitimacy and NGO politics 
In each of the three contexts, NGOs’ engagement in political action can be seen as central to 
processes of NGO legitimation and de-legitimation. This, in itself, is not unusual. NGOs generally 
have an uncomfortable relationship with politics, and tensions surrounding their engagement in 
politics are not unique to conflict-affected regions. This discomfort arises from the fact that 
despite primarily justifying their work in moral terms, NGOs are also concerned with pragmatic 
social action, and their objectives frequently overlap with the concerns of political actors. This 
starting point is problematic since it situates them on a knife-edge between sincere and 
contrived behaviour; altruistic behaviour can easily be confused with behaviour that is 
motivated by self-interest or an ulterior political motive and uses normative claims to disguise its 
baser objectives (Bryant 2005). 
As mentioned above however, these tensions are particularly fraught in contexts affected by 
violent conflict. In these contexts, fundamental questions about the character and goals of the 
state are usually highly contested, both domestically and internationally. Furthermore, in each of 
the three cases examined here, power changed hands between groups with very different 
visions about what state (or proto-state) institutions were for and how they should operate. This 
high degree of contestation provides a much more fraught backdrop for NGO legitimacy than 
usually exists in peaceful environments. In contexts where the state’s own legitimacy is widely 
questioned or challenged, NGOs that engage in political action can be viewed and depicted not 
merely as posing a political threat, but as representing a fundamental threat to state 
sovereignty. In each of the three cases examined here, debates about NGOs’ political action 
tended to revolve around more fundamental questions about whether or not NGOs were 
undermining or supporting the state (or a particular political party). Debates around what kind 
of political strategy was most effective or appropriate were also evident, and in some cases 
became central to NGOs’ reputational management strategies. 
In the OPT, Hamas and Fatah have divergent visions of a legitimate political settlement and the 
most desirable road to peace. Because domestic political actors fundamentally disagree about 
the form that any eventual solution to the conflict should take, NGOs can be criticised by some 
for working to normalise relations with Israel by working with Israeli organisations, receiving 
funding from certain western donors, or working closely with the PNA (Brown 2003; Youngs & 
Michou 2011). At the same time, they can also be criticised by others (particularly liberal 
international actors) for adopting a very different stance – refusing to work with Israeli 
organisations, or opposing the peace process (Youngs & Michou 2011). As the Peace NGO 
Forum, an organisation that facilitates cooperation between Palestinian and Israeli NGOs, stated 
in a recent FRIDE report, in the OPT, ‘everything is politics’ (Youngs & Michou 2011). In this 
competitive political terrain, even NGOs that eschewed explicit political action found it difficult 
to maintain legitimacy with all sides. Those that did seek to influence the peace process, or build 
peace at a local level, face an even greater challenge. Unlike the other two contexts examined 
here, NGOs in the OPT are expected to ‘assert and advance’ Palestinian sovereignty (Songco et 
al. 2006). In this context, peacebuilding activities were often interpreted as ‘normalisation’ or an 
attempt to reinforce the status quo. As Gawerc (2012: 91) has noted, “for Palestinians to 
maintain legitimacy in their society, the political needed to be stressed and clear”. The dual 
expectation that NGOs should both support the government in providing services and resist the 
occupation is a key source of tension (Songco et al. 2006).  
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In Sri Lanka, tensions existed between on the one hand a more populist/ nationalist vision of Sri 
Lankan politics espoused by nationalist groups (and after 2005, the ruling SLFP party) and on the 
other, a more liberal cosmopolitan vision promoted by the architects and supporters of the 
peace process – western donors and the United National Party. Liberal actors conferred 
legitimacy on NGOs on the basis of their capacity to support reform of existing systems of 
governance, while nationalists deemed NGOs legitimate only insofar as they were able to 
contribute to a state-led process of political change and did not undermine cultural norms 
(Walton 2012). Although the divisions between these two visions remained dormant through the 
early years of the ceasefire period (between 2002 to 2005), they became more intense in 
competitive environment that emerged after 2005, and NGOs’ capacity to influence social and 
political processes became double-edged: “it boosted legitimacy in the eyes of liberal 
peacebuilders, whilst de-legitimating them in the eyes of nationalists” (Walton 2012: 31). 
These cases suggest that NGO legitimacy was most challenged during periods of transition, when 
new groups were establishing themselves and the boundaries of legitimate political action 
shifted. These transitional moments that occurred between periods of peace and war, or during 
and after and change in government, created uncertainties around issues of political authority 
and influence. This either led to NGOs being perceived as a greater threat (as in Nepal and the 
OPT), or created new configurations of political power, which provided space for critical groups 
to generate political capital out of attacking them (as in Sri Lanka).  
In response to these tensions, NGOs sought to bolster their positions by adapting their political 
strategies and policing the accepted boundaries of NGO political action. Conflicting visions of 
NGOs’ legitimate role in politics were highlighted by disputes within the NGO sector and broader 
civil society about what constituted legitimate or effective forms of political action. 
In Nepal, Heaton Shrestha highlights tensions between NGOs and the broadly-based movement, 
the Citizen’s Movement for Democracy and Peace (CMDP), formed in 2005, and the NGO sector. 
The CMDP rejected the NGO sector on the grounds that these organisations were highly 
factional and motivated by a desire to promote their group’s interests for “personal and 
institutional benefit, rather than that of the ‘voiceless’ group itself’” (Heaton Shrestha & Adhikari 
2010: 306). The CMDP deliberately sought to distance itself from the political realm, attempting 
to maintain a counter-political realm by setting limits on the extent to which NGOs could engage 
with the movement (Heaton Shrestha & Adhikari 2010).5 This counter-political approach 
responded to the fact that national political parties had used NGOs as a means of rewarding 
supporters or bolstering grassroots mobilisation (Miklian et al. 2011).  
In-fighting within civil society and between NGOs can also be observed in the OPT. Franks 
(2009), for example, interviews NGO representatives who argue that some peacebuilding NGOs 
are undermining the grassroots peace process. A number of internal divisions existed amongst 
NGOs who worked closely with the PA, and those that chose not to (Hanafi & Tabar 2003). 
Shawa (2005) shows how a number of NGOs in the OPT argued that their effectiveness as service 
providers was reliant upon distancing themselves from politics and political factions. Gawerc 
(2012: 80) describes how a number of peacebuilding NGOs ‘managed the normalisation taboo’ 
                                                             
5 The term ‘counter-political’ is taken from Jonathan Spencer (2007) and is used to refer to ‘the 
performative construction of a realm the logic of which is meant to contrast with that which guides 
politics (Heaton Shrestha & Adhikari 2010: 299). 
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by reducing their cross-border peacebuilding initiatives and focusing instead on uni-national 
community service initiatives. 
In Sri Lanka, NGOs pursued a variety of strategies to negotiate the contested political terrain that 
confronted them after 2005.  One of the most prominent and well-known organisations in the 
country – the Sarvodaya Shramadana Movement – pursued a counter-political model of change 
that rejected the norms of the party political arena and drew on Gandhian and Buddhist 
concepts. Another large national NGO – the Foundation for Co-Existence – responded to attacks 
from nationalists by emphasising the technical aspects of its peacebuilding work. In both cases, 
these organisations’ irresolute engagement with politics generated tensions with their key 
audiences (domestic political actors on the one hand and international donors on the other). 
While these organisations were able to make their political approaches more palatable to one or 
other side, their strategies failed to satisfy all audiences (Walton 2012). Both organisations were 
criticised by other NGOs for adopting approaches that were seen as apolitical or ineffective (see 
Walton 2012). 
Another important feature of the three contexts was that struggles for NGO legitimacy were 
intimately tied up with other domestic actors’ own efforts to establish or consolidate their 
legitimacy in a divided and contested political context. In some cases, processes of NGO 
legitimation and de-legitimation were instrumentalised – discrediting or promoting NGOs was 
used as a strategy for other actors to boost their own legitimacy. Rebel groups used NGOs as a 
means of boosting their credibility. In Sri Lanka, during the peace process, the LTTE used 
engagement with NGOs as a tool for consolidating its own credibility. During the ceasefire 
period, the LTTE used its relief wing, the Tamils Rehabilitation Organisation (TRO) as a means of 
bolstering its humanitarian credentials to the outside world (Walton 2008). In Nepal, the Unified 
Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) had stridently opposed NGOs but began to adopt a more 
conciliatory approach towards the sector as they worked closely with the civil society groups 
that led the Democracy Movement (Shah 2008). This collaboration was arguably critical in 
restoring the Maoists’ legitimacy internationally (Shah 2008: 47). 
Opponents of NGOs in Sri Lanka used critiques as a means of promoting their own political 
visions for a more morally-informed society or highlighting the threat posed by international 
actors to Sri Lankan sovereignty (Walton 2008). In the OPT, the PA government sought to de-
legitimise the NGO sector during various critical moments. As Hammami (2000) has described, 
these moments followed efforts by donors to provide significant funds directly to the sector – 
for example, after the World Bank established a $15 million NGO fund in 1995, and after the UN 
provided $20 million to human rights NGOs in 1999. Palestinian NGOs were also used by donors 
as a means of legitimating their own strategies of engagement in the region. There was a 
tendency to use the provision of funds to NGOs as a means of being seen to be ‘doing 
something’ in Gaza, without engaging with Hamas or addressing more fundamental political 
questions (Youngs & Michou 2011: 16).   
8 Conclusions 
This paper has highlighted a number of important and unusual features associated with NGO 
legitimation processes in conflict-affected and transitional contexts. First, in these contexts, the 
credibility of NGO sectors has been damaged by a growth in foreign funding and NGOs’ 
‘Everything is Politics’  
Walton 
17 | P a g e  
 
increasingly close links to international funders. In each of the three cases examined here, these 
links have increased internal competition amongst NGOs, and driven a process of 
professionalization and depoliticisation. While this trend can also be observed in peaceful 
contexts, what is unusual about the contexts examined here is the way in which growing 
concerns about NGOs’ motivations and political objectives have become closely bound up with 
broader concerns about international efforts to build peace. In the conflict-affected 
environments analysed here, a growth in NGO funding has fuelled accusations that NGOs are 
being used by foreign donors to pursue their political agendas or that they are posing a threat to 
state sovereignty. The fact that NGOs became closely associated with wider international 
support for a peace process or a wider peacebuilding strategy was damaging in all of these three 
contexts. This damage was related to the questionable efficacy and legitimacy of liberal 
peacebuilding interventions themselves.  
Second, NGOs’ growing involvement in liberal peacebuilding and statebuilding interventions in 
these contexts involved transgression of political, institutional and territorial boundaries. These 
interventions also blurred the boundaries between previously distinct categories of NGOs’ work.  
By blurring distinctions between NGOs, international donors and the state, these modes of 
engagement exacerbated existing tensions surrounding NGOs identities and damaged their 
legitimacy.  
Third, the paper has described how, in these contexts, NGO legitimacy is heavily politicised. NGO 
legitimation and de-legitimation was intimately linked to the state and other domestic political 
actors’ own struggles for legitimacy, which made them more liable to fluctuate during political 
transitions and be instrumentalised by a variety of political actors. NGOs in all contexts 
employed various tactics and strategies to alleviate tensions posed by changes in the political 
environment to varying degrees of success. 
Existing accounts of NGO legitimacy rarely acknowledge these critical dimensions of NGO 
legitimacy in conflict-affected and transitional contexts. Most research and commentary has 
placed issues relating to NGOs’ accountability, representativeness and performance and the 
heart of attempts to understand legitimation processes. While the tensions surrounding NGOs in 
the contexts examined in this paper show that issues of accountability and representativeness 
are not irrelevant in conflict-affected regions, the analysis has demonstrated that these 
processes of legitimation are primarily driven by their association with international actors and 
their peacebuilding strategies on the one hand, and by the legitimation strategies of domestic 
political actors on the other.  
In conflict-affected environments, NGO legitimacy is better understood as a highly contested 
and politically symbolic set of properties closely shaped by changes in the broader political 
climate. The political incentives associated with legitimising or de-legitimising NGOs are often 
more important than NGOs’ own performance. The cases have also demonstrated that 
legitimacy is a highly contextual phenomenon. NGO legitimacy should not be viewed as related 
to characteristics that are generalizable across countries, but rather is best understood in 
relation to the particular power relations and the social, cultural and political discourses that 
exist in any given national arena. In the contexts examined here these power relations 
fluctuated significantly as new groups came to power and new political settlements were 
established. These periods of transition tended to be particularly challenging for NGOs, who 
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often faced more direct opposition from ascendant political groups, and had to adapt their 
political strategies to function effectively in the new political environment. 
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